Immanuel Kant on Dignity
By William Michael
“Dignity” in talk of “the dignity of human beings” ascribes to humans a kind of worth that is supposed to be of the highest significance for how humans are treated and which all humans share in equally. We are maybe so used to this idea that we don’t find it puzzling. But how can it be true? And if it were, how would we know? Kant’s philosophy provides answers to these questions.
For Kant, our moral lives are an aspect of our ordinary lives that should astonish. In this mood he wrote (Critique of Practical Reason):
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more frequently and persistently one's meditation deals with them: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.
We’ll soon get to “the moral law within,” in the form of the Categorical Imperative, but for now let it stand for the whole of the moral, which it almost does for Kant.
Kant was deeply moved by humans acting purely for the sake of (moral) duty. His idea of the moral is very pure and for him acting for the sake of duty has nothing to do with psychology, even “nice” psychology like empathy, let alone anything neurotic, or the motive of gain or advantage. Doing one’s duty is a pure matter of willing (here meaning choosing) the good because it is good.
To find the meaning and reality of moral acts, Kant did philosophy. His philosophy teaches that moral acts disclose something real about the beings that can act morally: namely, that they are free, reasonable and rational beings. The thought is that only free, reasonable and rational beings would be able to act purely for the sake of duty.
The concepts “free” and “reasonable and rational” are difficult, and understanding Kant’s conception of “free, reasonable and rational beings” is difficult too. However, we have already come across a clue as to what he meant. The purity he finds in the motivation behind moral actions can be thought of as freedom from psychological determination. To be free in this sense is to be, as it were, master in one’s own house. At the same time, to be free in a related sense is to be determined only by that which is in agreement with, not foreign or alien to, one’s true nature. That nature is reasonable and rational, and so to be free is to act for reasons and from reason.
This is why for Kant morality is practical reason. (Practical reason – what I have reason to do – not theoretical reason: what I have reason to believe. Practical reason not sentiment or tradition, to name two key contrasts. It is notable that Kant did not oppose reason to religion. He was a committed Lutheran throughout his adult life.)
Kant’s idea that morality is practical reason is a general idea in need of specific content. “Be reasonable and rational” is not awfully useful guidance. We need some meaningful rule or law – “the moral law within” perhaps. The specific content Kant gives morality is found in the Categorical Imperative (CI). Here I’ll consider the CI to better understand “dignity”. The CI reads (in its second version in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals):
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
If we think about the meaning of “dignity” using the CI, it suggests that we understand that always treating persons as ends and never simply as means is a fitting way to treat beings that have the kind of “inner worth” (Kant’s words) called “dignity”. Seeing this connection we gain a richer, deeper and more useful notion of dignity. We could keep thinking: The CI suggests that my own dignity is important, and not for selfish motives but as a result of the “humanity” in me. And so on…
We can now see how Kant’s philosophy answers the questions opening this essay. If there are free, reasonable and rational beings, then they possess a special kind of worth unlike anything else in the world. The word “dignity” – why not? – is used to express this worth.
How can all humans share in dignity equally? There is no guarantee that any human will act from their nature as a free, reasonable and rational being, but since they are such a being, they could, and in that, each of us is the same. Indeed, given the many ways humans are different – in upbringing, IQ and EQ, talents, tastes, looks, status etc – then perhaps there is no other cogent interpretation of the thought, so important to the modern world, that we are all equal.
Finally, I know all this how? It is disclosed to me in my experience of acts done purely for the sake of duty. Knowing Kant’s philosophy, I understand this.
William Michael studied philosophy and law at Otago and Auckland universities in the 90s … and, for better or worse, has never really stopped thinking about such stuff.