Child Poverty and Euthanasia: joining the dots
Sue Buckley and John Kleinsman
Child poverty and euthanasia are potentially risky topics for politicians in any year, but especially in an election year. The decision late last year to remove the End of Life Choice Bill from the private members ballot lest it become a political football is a demonstration of this caution. Is there a connection between these two contentious topics? The naming of the End of Life Choice Bill points to a possible link between the two, that of 'choice'.
Over recent decades the notion of 'choice' has been widely adopted in economic and social policy discussions, with human actors now widely viewed as autonomous individuals who have a fundamental right to make decisions on the basis of their own interests, whether in health, education, career, or lifestyle. Lifestyle decisions, such as what they spend their money on or how they spend their time or the sort of job they do, are seen as choices freely taken from a smorgasbord of options.
We have also come to view people's particular social and personal situations, including their unemployment and health status, more and more as the product of their prior choices. Without question, many people who are the recipients of a State sponsored benefit receive it because of circumstances beyond their control. Even when it seems that a person's situation may be the result of so-called 'bad choices', it remains the case that their personal choices cannot always be separated from the limitations imposed on their personal freedom by structural constraints beyond their control that define their particular societal and familial context.
As United States academics Kelly Brownell et al note, reflecting on whether we should pursue punishment strategies as a way of dealing with people who are obese: "environmental conditions can override individual physical and psychological regulatory systems that might otherwise stand in the way of weight gain and obesity, hence undermining personal responsibility, narrowing choices, and eroding personal freedoms."1
Despite this fact, the overly simplistic view that people are essentially 'responsible' for the situation they find themselves in continues to shape the development of social benefit policies in many countries, including New Zealand. Thus, for example, where once it was held that benefits for sole or unemployed parents should be set at a level that would enable recipients and their children to participate in society like everyone else, now parents are exhorted to 'work their way' out of poverty. Consequently, those who are not able to achieve this become prone to seeing themselves, and to being seen, either as 'outsiders' or, at best, as 'unworthy' members of society.
In line with this, the notion of citizenship has also shifted over time, with a greater emphasis now on 'active citizenship' rather than 'passive citizenship'. While passive citizenship focuses on the rights that are inherent in being a citizen and belonging to a particular society, active citizenship focuses on responsibilities and obligations as the 'price' for belonging. In an article discussing the relationship between child poverty, child rights and active citizenship, O'Brien and Salonen2 use the following definition of 'active citizenship': "A new ideal of citizenship or a new set of rights and duties based on a conception of a claimant (eg an unemployed person) as an active citizen. The active citizen is granted more autonomy and choice but in return is assumed to be self-responsible, flexible and mobile". It is implied here that the passive citizen should not expect to have the same rights or receive the same rewards. The subtle but powerful message is that those who, for a variety of reasons, do not work are 'second-rate' citizens because they 'reap the bounty of others' hard work'.
There are, of course, positive aspects to both views of citizenship; the concept of the 'passive citizen' is in the first instance associated with rights to food, shelter, work, free speech and so on, that are part of the inherent dignity of being human. Meanwhile the concept of 'active citizenship' is associated, in the first instance, with the relational responsibilities all human beings have towards each other, including the duties associated with contributing to the functioning of society and to one's own and one's family's wellbeing. However, an overly narrow focus on 'active citizenship' carries the risk of overlooking or disregarding those citizens who are, for any number of reasons, unable to be 'active'.
O'Brien and Salonen argue that changes in welfare policies over the last two decades in New Zealand have increasingly been based on the notion of 'active citizenship'. The setting of benefit levels and provision of tax relief for families have been intentionally designed to ensure that there is a clear economic advantage in working rather than living on a benefit. While this helps support 'working families', as noted above, it is also intended to encourage citizens to 'choose' work over unemployment. However, one of the unintended consequences of this policy shift is that those who are most vulnerable, children, the sick, the elderly and those with disabilities, who are not able to make such choices, are not just overlooked but become casualties of policies designed to reward and sustain the 'active'.
As O'Brien and Salonen note, the children of beneficiaries do not have a choice about whether their parents are in work or not and, if benefit levels are insufficient, then the children have poverty thrust upon them along with its associated effects on their long-term health and education. All of which means that a policy choice that favours rewarding parents in paid work can only be justified by a calculation that the gains which follow from providing an incentive to work outweigh the needs of the children of beneficiaries. This is clearly a utilitarian argument. Specifically, it neglects the real and immediate needs of many children who are presently living in poverty. It also fails to address the 'unpaid work' of nurturing involved in parenting,
Defining people as 'active' or 'passive' citizens and rewarding the economically active places children, the elderly and the disabled in the precarious position of having to claim rights as 'passive citizens'. In addition an overly narrow focus on the 'active citizen' means that 'passive citizens' become increasingly exposed to social censure. There is ample evidence in the derogatory connotations associated with welfare dependency that 'non-active' citizens are not only held in disrepute by others, but that they soon come to regard their own plight negatively. Consequently, there is little difference between being a 'non-active citizen' and becoming a 'burden on society'.
The use of political rhetoric that divides citizens into the 'deserving and underserving' makes this clear: 'strivers and skivers' (United Kingdom), and 'lifters not leaners' (Australia). Language such as this doesn't just alienate the unemployed, sole parents and other beneficiaries; it alienates all of us because we begin to view these groups of individuals as 'other'.
The focus on 'choice' and citizenship provides a useful lens for making sense of the controversial debate about choices at the end of life. In a society that accepts and emphasises the right and duty of people to make their own individual choices and the importance of taking responsibility for their personal situation, it naturally follows that the fundamental right, and possibly the duty, of the active citizen to choose how they live, should extend to choices about death.
However, the elevation of the 'active citizen' that informs recent welfare policies also risks creating classes of vulnerable citizens who are viewed, and view themselves, as a burden on society. Those particularly susceptible to this are the sick, the elderly and those with disabilities. Being seen as a 'burden' on the rest of society exposes these citizens to the same sort of criticism as beneficiaries and the corresponding weight of guilt that they are 'swallowing up resources'.
A widespread emphasis on individual autonomy and a social policy environment that defends and promotes the right to choose, with little regard to the limits of people's choices, can too easily obscure the negative impact of law changes that are justified on the basis of so-called choice, both on individuals as well as society at large. One outcome of this is that those of us who, through fortune or 'God-given' ability find ourselves healthy and well-off, can easily 'blame' others for their situation, blind to the deeper structural dynamics that inevitably shape and limit the choices people make; we can back away from child poverty and even tolerate it because their parents made bad choices; we can support and even champion the choice for euthanasia or assisted suicide while overlooking the social environment where those 'choosing' to die have come to see themselves as passive citizens, that is, as unworthy consumers of valuable and increasingly scarce resources – as 'lives unworthy of life'.
Supporting policies that allow for 'choice' might appear benign, but in an environment where some classes of citizens are at risk of being viewed and viewing themselves as unworthy or undeserving, providing 'choice' can be a negative and threatening experience. Just as the child of a beneficiary does not choose poverty, so those who see themselves, or are seen by others, as 'swallowing up resources', may find they have no real 'end of life choice' should our society make euthanasia and assisted suicide legal and acceptable options.
Sue Buckley is a researcher for The Nathaniel Centre and John Kleinsman is director of The Nathaniel Centre
1. Brownell, K. D., Kersh, R., Ludwig, D. S., Post, R. C., Puhl, R. M., Schwartz, M. B., et al. Personal Responsibility And Obesity: A Constructive Approach To A Controversial Issue. Health Affairs, 29(3), 379-387
2. O'Brien, M., & Salonen, T. Child poverty and child rights meet active citizenship: A New Zealand and Sweden case study. Childhood, 18(2), 211-226.